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NO MORE QUID PRO QUO: ABANDONING THE PERSONAL
BENEFIT REQUIREMENT IN INSIDER TRADING LAW
Shannon Seiferth*
ABSTRACT
A circuit split between the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision, United States v. New-
man, and the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision, United States v. Salman, illustrates
problems in insider trading law dating back over thirty years to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Dirks v. SEC. Dirks held that when a corporate insider provides
information to an outside party who then trades on the information, it must be
shown that the insider received some form of a personal benefit for providing the
information in order to impute liability. The courts in Newman and Salman dis-
agreed on the sort of evidence that suffices to prove such a personal benefit. As this
question is set to be decided by the Supreme Court, these cases provide an apt oppor-
tunity for reexamining the law of insider trading.
Although it might be argued that, for both moral and efficiency reasons, the
courts in Newman and Salman reached the right outcome, the analysis in both
decisions was strained as a result of the personal benefit requirement first articu-
lated in Dirks. As this Note discusses, this split demonstrates that proof of a
personal benefit as an element of insider trading in tipper/tippee cases should not
be required, as it creates unnecessarily subjective inquiries into the relationship
between the tipper and tippee, resulting in confusion in the boundaries of permissi-
ble trading activity. Because insider trading walks a fine line between behavior that
should be encouraged (the use of information for legitimate business purposes) and
discouraged (exploiting information obtained by virtue of an inside position for
personal gain), it is important to more clearly define the bounds of insider trading
activity. In place of requiring proof of a personal benefit, this Note argues that a
wholly new statutory approach to insider trading is warranted and offers an alter-
native statutory proposal that may serve as a starting point for a discussion of
adopting legislation.
INTRODUCTION
The Second Circuit’s 2014 decision in United States v. Newman1
became one of the most significant insider trading cases in recent
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, December 2016; B.A., University
of Michigan, 2012. I would like to thank Professor Adam C. Pritchard for many helpful
discussions and insights and my fellow Journal of Law Reform editors for their invaluable
feedback.
1. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242
(2015).
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years, resulting in prompt backlash from the media,2 an appeal to
the Supreme Court,3 two legislative proposals to overhaul insider
trading law,4 and a Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Salman,
explicitly declining to follow the holding of Newman.5 The key dis-
pute between the courts in Newman and Salman dates back to the
Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Dirks v. SEC, which held that
when a corporate insider provides information to an outside party
who then trades on the information, it must be shown that the in-
sider received some form of a personal benefit for providing the
information in order to constitute insider trading.6 While Newman
interpreted this element to require proof that the insider received a
benefit greater than an ephemeral friendship,7 Salman held that ev-
idence of a friendship or close family relationship might be
sufficient to satisfy the personal benefit element.8 Though New-
man’s requirement of a tangible benefit attempts to escape
subjective inquiries into the closeness of a relationship, it could
leave morally reprehensible trading behavior unchecked.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Salman to the question
of whether proof of an objective personal benefit, which “repre-
sents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature,” is needed to establish insider trading.9 Oral argument took
place October 5, 2016 and a ruling will be issued by June 2017.10
Even if the Court adopts the defendant’s view that insider trading
should require proof of an objective personal benefit, these cases
provide an apt opportunity for reexamining the law of insider
trading.
The dispute between the Second and Ninth Circuits in Newman
and Salman is emblematic of larger fissures in the law of insider
2. See Greg Stohr & Patricia Hurtado, Insider Trading Cases Imperiled as U.S. Supreme Court
Spurns Appeal, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2015, 9:31 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti
cles/2015-10-05/insider-trading-cases-imperiled-as-top-u-s-court-spurns-appeal.
3. Lyle Denniston, U.S. Appeals Major Insider Trading Case, SCOTUSBLOG (July 30, 2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/07/u-s-appeals-major-insider-trading-case/.
4. Peter J. Henning, Court Strikes on Insider Trading, and Congress Lobs Back, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/business/dealbook/
court-strikes-on-insider-trading-and-congress-lobs-back.html?_r=0.
5. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
899.
6. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662–63 (1983).
7. 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
8. 792 F.3d at 1093–94.
9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628, 2015 WL
7180648 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 10, 2015).
10. Nate Raymond, US Top Court Leans Toward Making Insider Trading Prosecutions Easier,
REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2016, 3:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-insidertrad
ing-idUSKCN12510B.
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trading. Because insider trading prohibitions currently rest on a
vaguely-worded, catch-all anti-fraud prohibition, insider trading law
has been shaped almost exclusively through the courts.11 The per-
sonal benefit requirement arose out of the Supreme Court’s belief
that an insider must have breached a fiduciary duty in order to have
committed insider trading. Nevertheless, subsequent decisions
eroded the strict reliance on this framework,12 but still tried to op-
erate within the confines of Supreme Court jurisprudence
requiring breach of a fiduciary duty. Because any judicial reform
would have to adhere to this fiduciary duty framework (or overrule
thirty-year-old precedent), this Note argues that the best vehicle for
reforming insider trading law is a statutory approach. A more pre-
cisely worded statute would help clarify many of the contours of the
insider trading prohibition that have created controversy and
confusion.
Part I outlines the moral and economic underpinnings for in-
sider trading law and examines the development of insider trading
law through precedent. Part II discusses the division between the
courts in Newman and Salman, drawing three key observations that
demonstrate the need for a new approach to insider trading law.
Part III advocates for a legislative response, critiques two different
legislative proposals to codify insider trading, and offers an alterna-
tive statutory proposal that may serve as a starting point for a
discussion of adopting legislation.
PART I: HISTORY OF INSIDER TRADING LAW
The development of insider trading law over time represents a
tension between the desire for both broad and narrow liability, flex-
ibility and predictability, and fairness and efficiency. The current
scope of insider trading law has broadly expanded from the strict
fiduciary duty requirements articulated in early cases, but this ex-
pansion comes at the expense of clarity in the law.
11. See Jorge Pesok, Insider Trading: No Longer Reserved for Insiders, 14 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV.
109, 110 (2015).
12. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2009); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Regulating insider trading in the post-
fiduciary duty era: equal access or property rights?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 80
(Stephen M. Bainbridge & William D. Warren eds., 2013); Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as
Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 940–41 (2014).
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A. Insider Trading Law Within the Broader Securities Regime
Securities regulation, broadly speaking, is primarily aimed at pro-
tecting investors by reducing informational disadvantages investors
suffer at the expense of corporate insiders and other market profes-
sionals.13 These laws seek to protect investors through two chief
means—promoting the disclosure of information,14 which provides
investors with similar access to information as insiders, and deter-
ring fraud,15 so that investors may not be taken advantage of by
other market participants.
These dual concerns of disclosure and fraud deterrence, which
are reflected in securities laws more generally, also animate insider
trading laws. On the one hand, what makes insider trading illegal is
the failure to disclose information that is not available to other mar-
ket participants.16 On the other, the reason that insider trading
seems so corrupt is that it enables one market participant—usually
the insider of a company—to take advantage of another market
participant on the basis of information they possess that is not avail-
able to the market generally.17 That is not to say, however, that the
securities regulation regime is aimed at creating a perfectly level
playing field—a distinction that will be explored further through-
out this Note. If insider trading is conceived of as the misuse of
informational advantages, insider trading law might be viewed as a
way of weeding out and proscribing the sorts of impermissible in-
formational advantages from those that are permissible.
13. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION 21 (4th ed. 2015).
14. Id. at 1.
15. Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934—the
primary acts regulating the securities markets—largely in response to the failure of state laws
to protect investors from being defrauded in the sale of securities. These state regulatory
regimes, which came to be termed “blue sky laws” because “lawmakers believed that ‘if securi-
ties legislation was not passed, financial pirates would sell citizens everything in [the] state but
the blue sky,’” were fragmented and did little to prevent fraudulent securities from being
sold to the emerging middle-class of investors. Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gelmann, A
Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 329, 331–33 (1988).  In fact, it was easy to evade state regulatory requirements by
simply selling to investors out of state, who were frequently left without a remedy. Id.
Through federal jurisdiction, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act could provide a coher-
ent regime, patching up the holes left by state laws and providing a remedy for investors that
were swindled by fraudulent sales made across state lines. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13,
at 96.
16. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 48 (“Insider trading is a fraud of pure
omission.”).
17. Steven McNamara, Insider Trading and Evolutionary Psychology: Strong Reciprocity,
Cheater Detection, and the Expanding Boundaries of the Law, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 241, 247
(2015).
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B. The Need for Insider Trading Law from a Moral and
Economic Perspective
Insider trading laws are predominantly justified either based on
moral intuitions or from the perspective of economic efficiency.
This Part briefly discusses both of these rationales to highlight some
of the challenges faced by insider trading law in determining the
scope of what kinds of conduct should be prohibited. While moral
intuitions might drive some to say that it would be more fair for all
investors to have complete access to information, that could come
at the expense of market efficiency. For years, the insider trading
regime has grappled with the tradeoff between these two funda-
mental values.18
For those that justify prohibitions on insider trading from a
moral standpoint, insider trading laws serve an expressive function:
they signal the appearance of fairly operating markets by stamping
out the sort of behavior that manifests greed and lack of self-re-
straint.19 Many view the exploitation of informational advantages as
morally reprehensible, particularly if such exploitation results from
abuse by a person who is in a position of power or receives privi-
leged access to information.20 Empirical studies confirm that
people tend to feel that those who are entrusted with confidential
information and abuse it for personal profit should be punished.21
Indeed, before the government ever prosecuted anyone for insider
trading under federal securities laws, both legal scholars and those
in the industry admonished the practice.22 The widespread public
outrage over high-profile insider trading cases like Raj Rajaratnam
of Galleon Group,23 SAC Capital,24 and Jeffrey Skilling of Enron25
18. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–34 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 661 n.21 (1983).
19. Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading,
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 434 (2013).
20. McNamara, supra note 17, at 247.
21. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green and Matthew B. Kugler, When is it Wrong to Trade Stocks on the
Basis of Non-Public Information? Public Views of the Morality of Insider Trading, 39 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 445, 465 (2011).
22. Robert A. Prentice, Permanently Reviving the Temporary Insider, 36 J. CORP. L. 343, 380
(2011).
23. David Glovin, Patricia Hurtado, and Bob Van Voris, Rajaratnam Guilty on All Counts
in U.S. Insider-Trading Case, BLOOMBERG (May 11, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2011-05-11/rajaratnam-is-found-guilty-of-all-counts-in-galleon-insider-
trading-trial (“[L]ike so many others recently, he let greed and corruption cause his
undoing.”).
24. Nate Raymond, SAC Capital to Pay $10 Million in Investors’ Insider Trading Lawsuit,
REUTERS (Dec. 24, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-insidertrading-
saccapital-idUSKBN0U717A20151224; see also Nathan Vardi, Mathew Martoma Sentenced to Nine
Years for Insider Trading, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2014, 4:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
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further reveals a moral opprobrium for insider trading. As journal-
ist Charles Gasparino wrote, “The notion that someone has an
unfair advantage over someone else seems un-American; after all,
our nation is built on fundamental ideas of equality and fairness.”26
In addition to the idea that insider trading exhibits greed and
exploitation, insider trading laws may reflect the moral intuition
that one should reap benefits in proportion to their efforts.27 Access
to inside information frequently results simply from some fortuity
of being in the “right place at the right time.”28 By contrast, if an
individual achieves an informational advantage as the result of re-
search, innovation, or other value-added behavior, the law may
want to reward and encourage such action.29
Indeed, securities laws currently leave some space for informa-
tional disparities, though over time the law has evolved to permit
less informational disparities. Regulation FD, promulgated in 2000,
prohibits the selective disclosure of information by analysts to bro-
kers, dealers, and other investment professionals, to ensure that all
such professionals receive information at the same time.30 Though
Regulation FD represented a substantial step in leveling the playing
field among professional investors, professional investors still have a
distinct advantage over lay investors in the ability, time, and re-
sources that they have to process material information.31 Arguably,
the advantages that professional investors have over lay investors
reap some benefits for society, either by enabling markets to oper-
ate more efficiently32 or by compensating the analyst for the efforts
nathanvardi/2014/09/08/mathew-martoma-sentenced-to-nine-years-for-insider-trading/#4c
d4617522e5.
25. Mary Flood, Enron’s Skilling Charged with Insider Trading, Fraud and More, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE (Feb. 19, 2004, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/business/enron/article/En
ron-s-Skilling-charged-with-insider-trading-1987563.php.
26. CHARLES GASPARINO, CIRCLE OF FRIENDS 11 (2013).
27. McNamara, supra note 17, at 247.
28. Prentice, supra note 22, at 381.
29. Id. at 381–82.
30. Fair Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2016).
31. Patrick T. Morgan, Regulation FD: Leveling the Playing Field For Some But Not For Others,
66 MO. L. REV. 959, 994 (2001).
32. LAWRENCE D. BROWN ET. AL, SKIN IN THE GAME: THE ACTIVITIES OF BUY-SIDE ANALYSTS
AND THE DETERMINANTS OF THEIR STOCK RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2016), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2458544 (“[B]uy-side analysts have strong incentives to
identify attributes of high-quality earnings and ‘red flags’ of misreporting”); CFA Centre for
Financial Market Integrity & Nat’l Investor Relations Institute, Best Practice Guidelines Gov-
erning Analyst/Corporate Issuer Relations, CFA INSTITUTE, 4 (Feb. 2005) https://www.cfainsti
tute.org/learning/products/publications/ccb/Pages/ccb.v2005.n7.4004.aspx (“Open com-
munication facilitates fair and consistent information which helps investors make sound
decisions and allocate their capital appropriately.”).
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of obtaining information.33 Furthermore, while the broader invest-
ing public may be able to overcome some informational
disadvantages they have vis-à-vis analysts—for instance, by purchas-
ing analyst research or employing a stock broker—advantages held
by a corporate insider who has exclusive access to a company’s in-
formation are far more difficult to overcome.34 Hence, there is a
need for prohibitions on insider trading in order to achieve
fairness.
In addition to these moral underpinnings, insider trading laws
can be rationalized from an economic perspective: insider trading
prevents the markets from functioning efficiently. Though the im-
pact of insider trading on market efficiency has been a matter of
substantial academic debate, on balance, the empirical evidence
suggests insider trading has harmful effects on the market and,
thus, its regulation has positive effects.35 Intuitively, this makes
sense. If investors perceive the markets as operating unfairly, they
may be chilled from transacting. Moreover, insider trading imposes
transaction costs: because investors cannot identify those in the
market who enjoy an informational advantage, stock prices will de-
viate more from their true value.36 Chilling effects and transaction
costs both occur in the secondary markets, but insider trading can
also have negative impacts on primary markets, that is, for corpora-
tions issuing new shares. Issuers may not be able to fetch as high of
a price as they could otherwise, because investors will automatically
discount to compensate for the risk that insider traders could take
advantage of them.37 Conversely, market efficiency may also be in-
hibited by too much regulation of insider trading. More regulatory
33. Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1023, 1028 (1990).
34. Id. at 1032.
35. The harmful market effects that have empirically been shown to result from insider
trading are numerous: stock market volatility, imposing unfair costs on market makers, de-
creasing market liquidity, raising the cost of capital, and disadvantaging small shareholders.
Prentice, supra note 22, at 385; contra HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(1966) (arguing that insider trading causes security prices to more accurately reflect their
true value); Jonathan R. Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 YALE FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 1899 (2007), http://
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2346&context=fss_papers (arguing
that insider trading can serve valuable signaling functions and thus help uncover corporate
fraud and corruption); Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where is the Line?, 2013 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 330, 333 (2013) (arguing that too much insider trading regulation chills inves-
tors from making legitimate trades because they are not sure whether their conduct will be
prohibited).
36. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 330.
37. Id. at 330–31.
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red tape may prevent market professionals and other investors from
making legitimate trades.38
Yet aside from these moral and efficiency concerns, which define
many of the limits on the scope of insider trading, it is important to
consider the practical limits to what conduct can be proscribed. As
Justice Powell noted in Dirks v. SEC, insider trading laws may not
capture all types of behavior that are morally reprehensible:
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted
by law, one’s trading on material nonpublic information is be-
havior that may fall below ethical standards of conduct. But in
a statutory area of the law such as securities regulation, where
legal principles of general application must be applied, there
may be “significant distinctions between actual legal obliga-
tions and ethical ideals.”39
This statement predicted the course that insider trading law would
take as it formed in the years following that precedential 1983 deci-
sion. In particular, insider trading law as expressed by the Supreme
Court largely represents an under-inclusive regime, where not all
immoral activities are punishable by law.40 In part, this may be be-
cause comporting insider trading law with moral sensibilities would
require a flexible and expansive reach of insider trading law. Such
flexibility in the law would be at odds with the need for predictabil-
ity and clarity in the law to put investors and traders on notice
before inflicting the severe civil and criminal penalties of insider
trading. However, in recent years, the SEC has pushed courts to
recognize new forms of insider trading using the existing molds of
precedent, expanding liability to a broader range of contexts.41
These decisions have created divergences amongst circuits, result-
ing in a muddled body of law that is at times perplexing, sometimes
even incoherent.42 As Professor Langevoort writes, “Much of the
complexity of the law of insider trading—something long recog-
nized as a problem in this area—is a product of quixotic attempts
by the courts to resolve this tension [between flexibility and
predictability].”43
38. See infra, Part I.D.
39. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661 n.21 (1983).
40. See 18 INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, & PREVENTION § 2.01 (West
Group 2001) [hereinafter REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, & PREVENTION].
41. Crimmins, supra note 35, at 332–33.
42. See id. at 356 n.83.
43. REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, & PREVENTION, supra note 40, at §1.02[4].
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C. The Early Development of Insider Trading Law Through Precedent:
A Tale of Two Regimes
Neither the Securities Act of 1933 (“The Securities Act”) nor the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“The Exchange Act”)—the
primary acts governing federal securities laws violations—contain a
provision specifically forbidding insider trading. In fact, the words
“insider trading” appear nowhere within these acts. Insider trading
actions are widely understood to fall under the reach of SEC Rule
10b-5 (promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act), the
catch-all anti-fraud prohibition also used to prosecute corporations
for making false or misleading statements to investors. Rule 10b-5
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
. . . .
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.44
In part, Congress’s reluctance to clearly define insider trading law
has been explained as a conscious decision on the part of the SEC
and Congress—they don’t want to provide would-be wrongdoers
with a “blueprint for fraud.”45 Furthermore, it may reflect a reluc-
tance to make the law so inflexible that it is inapplicable in novel
situations—especially those novel situations that appear morally
reprehensible.46 As a result of the vagueness in the language of Rule
10b-5, insider trading law is predominantly the product of
precedent.
A “watershed step”47 in the development of insider trading law,
In re Cady, Roberts,48 laid the foundation for a broad interpretation
of Rule 10b-5 by recognizing that fraud did not have to take place
through a face-to-face transaction: open market insider trading also
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016) (emphasis added).
45. REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, & PREVENTION, supra note 40, §2.01. However, in 2000
the SEC did adopt three specific insider trading rules.  These rules relate to the scienter
required for insider trading liability (Rule 10b5-1), when a fiduciary duty is present in a
misappropriation case (Rule 10b5-2), and selective disclosure by companies and their senior
executives (Regulation FD). Id. at §2.04[4].
46. Id. at §2.01.
47. Id. at §2.02[2].
48. In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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constitutes fraud.49 According to Cady, Roberts, the anti-fraud provi-
sions of Rule 10b-5 “are not intended as a specification of particular
acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to
encompass the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage
may be taken of investors and others.”50 Cady, Roberts suggested two
different rationales that give rise to a corporate insider’s duty to
abstain from trading on inside information.51 First is “the existence
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone.”52 Second, “inherent unfairness” re-
sults “where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”53 Depending on
which Cady, Roberts rationale was understood to define insider trad-
ing, the scope of liability would vary. Insider trading liability would
be more narrow if it focused merely on a special relationship be-
tween the insider and the source of the information. By contrast,
the latter articulation of the “inherent unfairness” of such informa-
tional advantages suggests a broader duty to the market to forgo
trading on material, non-public information.
The Second Circuit adopted this latter theory of broad liability in
its 1968 decision, Texas Gulf Sulphur.54 In adopting what is known as
a parity-of-information rule, the Second Circuit interpreted Rule
10b-5 as promoting “relatively equal access to material informa-
tion,”55 suggesting that all investors should have the same
opportunities to reap the rewards of the securities markets and,
likewise, bear similar risks.56 But when insider trading came before
the Supreme Court in Chiarella, the case that “laid the ground-
work”57 for the Supreme Court’s treatment of insider trading,
Justice Powell focused on the first Cady, Roberts element, the exis-
tence of a duty, as the crux of an insider trading violation.58
Chiarella held that, as a threshold requirement for insider trading
liability, a fiduciary duty must exist—and that the duty must be bro-
ken. In Chiarella, Justice Powell wrote that Section 10(b) was not
49. REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, & PREVENTION, supra note 40, §2.02[2].
50. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at *3.
51. Id. at *4.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
55. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 851–52.
57. A.C. Pritchard, Launching the Insider Trading Revolution: SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 33, 48 (Stephen M. Bainbridge & Wil-
liam D. Warren eds., 2013).
58. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1980).
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intended to reach “every instance of financial unfairness”;59 rather,
a duty to forgo trading arises merely “from a specific relationship
between two parties.”60 Concerned with chilling legitimate trading
activity and investment research,61 Justice Powell wanted to reign in
the SEC by significantly pushing back on the broad “equal access”
regime articulated in Texas Gulf. But, the decision did not entirely
prevent the SEC from pursuing more novel theories of insider trad-
ing in ensuing years.
D. Tipper/Tippee Liability and the Personal Benefit Requirement
In 1983, the Supreme Court expanded insider trading liability
beyond situations where an insider, or one who otherwise had ac-
cess to inside information, personally traded on such information.
In Dirks, the Court recognized liability under some circumstances
where the insider does not necessarily trade on information, but
rather provides a tip to someone outside the organization who then
trades on the information.62 Echoing Chiarella, the Court empha-
sized the need for a special relationship giving rise to a fiduciary
duty to support a finding of insider trading liability. The tippee has
an obligation not to trade on information received from an insider
given his “role as a participant after the fact in the insider’s breach
of a fiduciary duty.”63
But when is the tipper, the one who provides the information,
liable? Without having breached a fiduciary duty,64 so Justice Pow-
ell’s argument goes, there can be no deception, as Rule 10b-5
requires.65 The Court concluded that in order to establish the
breach of a fiduciary duty, an improper purpose must be shown.66
The fiduciary duty to which the court implicitly referred is the duty
59. Id. at 232.
60. Id. at 233.
61. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 81–82; A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal
Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857, 860 (2015) [hereinafter Genesis].
62. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
63. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
64. Because Justice Powell grounded insider trading law in the breach of a fiduciary duty
in Chiarella, this was the necessary starting point for the analysis in Dirks. See Genesis, supra
note 61, at 860; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666 n.27.
65. Genesis, supra note 61, at 872 (“The breach of fiduciary duty by the insider is the
gravamen of the deceptive conduct”).
66. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
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of loyalty,67 under which an agent or employee may not misappropri-
ate the assets of the firm for an improper use.68 Just as insiders are
prohibited from trading on inside information, insiders cannot pro-
vide inside information “to an outsider for the . . . improper
purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain.”69
Thus, for the insider to have breached a duty in situations where,
rather than trading on inside information, an insider discloses it,
the insider must personally have obtained some benefit from mak-
ing the disclosure.70
In determining whether the insider received a benefit, Justice
Powell instructed that the focus should be on “objective criteria”:
i.e., “a pecuniary gain,” “a reputational benefit that will translate
into future earnings,” “a relationship between the insider and the
recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter,” “an intention
to benefit the particular recipient,” or “a gift of confidential infor-
mation to a trading relative or friend.”71 In Dirks, because the
insider’s information sharing was motivated merely by a desire to
expose fraud and resulted in no direct or indirect benefit from hav-
ing shared the information, he could not be held liable for insider
trading.72
In limiting the scope of insider trading liability to situations
where a fiduciary duty had been breached, the Court rejected a rule
of equal access, explaining that such a rule could greatly inhibit the
role of market analysts.73 The market depends on the existence of
analysts to “ferret out” information, which promotes efficiency be-
cause stock prices incorporate new information and better
represent a company’s true value.74
As the next Part will illustrate, in subsequent years, the Court’s
efforts to both remain faithful to the breach of a fiduciary duty as
the crux of insider trading liability and expanding liability beyond
the mere trading on inside information by a corporate insider, has
resulted in analytical difficulties. In particular, these subsequent de-
cisions raised significant questions about how to apply the personal
benefit requirement articulated in Dirks.
67. Id. at 866.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1995) (“[A]n agent is subject to a duty to
his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his
agency.”).
69. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
70. Id. at 662.
71. Id. at 663–64.
72. Id. at 667.
73. Id. at 657-58.
74. Id. at 658.
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E. The Personal Benefit Requirement Under Expanding Theories
of Insider Trading
Insider trading continued to expand beyond the violation of a
fiduciary duty owed by a corporate insider to the corporation’s
shareholders, but this expansion raised questions about when the
personal benefit should apply to more novel theories of insider
trading, such as the misappropriation theory and theories of re-
mote tipping.
In the 1997 O’Hagan decision,75 the Supreme Court recognized a
theory of liability long-advanced by the SEC, called the misappro-
priation theory. Before O’Hagan, the Court had only recognized
insider trading falling under the pattern of what is termed the
“classical” theory of insider trading. Under classical insider trading
theory, a corporate insider commits insider trading when he trades
securities of a corporation to whom he owes a fiduciary duty on the
basis of material, nonpublic information.76 However, the Court rec-
ognized that the classical theory of insider trading did not capture
all of the sorts of conduct that seemed morally abhorrent.
In O’Hagan, the defendant, an attorney, traded on the options of
the target firm when he learned of a potential tender offer by virtue
of his employment with the law firm.77 Though the defendant owed
no duty to the corporation whose shares he traded on because his
law firm represented the acquirer, the Court nevertheless held that
he owed a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, that is, his
employer and the firm’s client.78 The misappropriation theory
premises the trader’s liability on his “deception of those who en-
trusted him with access to confidential information.”79 The Court
further explained:
Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities
markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital
in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpub-
lic information is unchecked by law. An investor’s
informational disadvantage vis-a-vis a misappropriator with ma-
terial, nonpublic information stems from contrivance, not
75. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
76. Id. at 651–52.
77. Id. at 647–48.
78. Id. at 655–56.
79. Id. at 652. Nevertheless, in remaining faithful to the earlier decisions, Justice Gins-
burg noted in O’Hagan that had the defendant disclosed to his sources the intent to trade on
the information, his conduct would not be deceptive, and hence he could not be held liable
for insider trading. Id. at 659 n.9.
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luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with re-
search or skill.80
As the Court’s dicta suggests, the O’Hagan decision expanded in-
sider trading liability to behavior that seems morally wrong:
investors should not be allowed to profit from mere dumb luck of
being in the right place at the right time.81 The Court’s dicta also
suggests an efficiency rationale for recognizing the misappropria-
tion theory—regardless of where inside information is obtained
from, such informational disadvantages could have a chilling effect
on trading activity.
However, in so expanding insider trading liability, the Court cre-
ated further incoherencies and confusion in the law of insider
trading, in particular, whether proof of a benefit to the tipper
should be required in cases arising under the misappropriation the-
ory.82 In fact, earlier decisions—mostly pre-dating O’Hagan—
suggested the Dirks personal benefit requirement would not apply
in cases arising under the misappropriation theory.83 In cases
brought under the classical theory of insider trading, the applica-
tion of the Dirks test appeared fairly straightforward: Dirks
represented a case of classical insider trading, and a series of lower
court opinions accordingly construed the meaning of “benefit”
quite broadly.84 Yet in SEC v. Yun,85 the SEC argued that the per-
sonal benefit requirement was premised on the idea that a tippee
inherited the fiduciary duty owed to the corporation’s sharehold-
ers. Since under the misappropriation theory, no such duty is owed
to the shareholders by the trader, it would be nonsensical to apply
the Dirks test, since it was a means of proving whether a fiduciary
duty had been breached.86
80. Id. at 658–59.
81. See McNamara, supra note 17, at 265–66.
82. WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING §5.4.4 (3d ed. 2010).
83. Id.
84. Compare SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1998) (close relationship between
tipper and tippee suggested that tip was intended to benefit tippee) and SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d
623, 633 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that where tipper and tippee were friends, “[a]bsent some
legitimate reason for [the] disclosure, . . . the inference that [the] disclosure was an im-
proper gift of confidential corporate information is unassailable”), with SEC v. Maxwell, 341
F. Supp. 2d 941, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (no benefit found where defendant did not stand to
gain from disclosing inside information to his barber) and SEC v. Anton, No. 06-2274, 2009
WL 1109324, *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2009) (no benefit found where testimonies of both tipper
and tippee suggested the two were not friends and did not have a social or personal relation-
ship. The tipper had only been to tippee’s house once, did not have his personal contact
information, and had never received a gift from tippee).
85. SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
86. Id. at 1275.
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The Eleventh Circuit rejected the SEC’s argument in Yun, in-
stead holding that, as with classical insider trading cases, the SEC
must prove that a tipper expected to benefit from a tip in misappro-
priation cases.87 Otherwise, the plaintiffs could simply skirt the
requirement of proving a personal benefit by recasting a case under
the misappropriation theory instead of the classical theory.88
Another area in which the personal benefit test appears strained
is in situations of remote tippees—where a tippee improperly re-
ceives information and then discloses such information to another
tippee, who trades on it. The remote tippee is thus at least one layer
removed from the insider. Courts generally recognize the personal
benefit requirement still holds when there is a chain of tippers,89
even though as one gets further removed from the initial tip, it may
be difficult to know whether a tipper received a personal benefit.90
This Part has described courts’ growing tendencies to recognize
more novel theories of insider trading, often in situations where the
defendants’ moral culpability seemed apparent. But as the scope of
insider trading expands, it creates incoherencies in elements of
proof required for insider trading, which are premised on Supreme
Court cases recognizing more narrow incidents of insider trading
liability. The next Part will explore an issue that has become a mat-
ter of much debate following two conflicting Circuit Court
decisions—namely, what constitutes sufficient evidence to prove
that a tipper received a personal benefit for disclosing inside
information.
PART II: THE FAILINGS OF THE PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST IN
NEWMAN AND SALMAN
Two recent cases, arising in the Second and Ninth Circuit respec-
tively, called the application of the personal benefit test further into
question. Despite the generally broad definition of personal benefit
embraced by lower courts, the Second Circuit’s decision in United
87. Id. at 1276.
88. Id. at 1279.
89. See, e.g., SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2012); Maio, 51 F.3d at 632 (7th Cir.
1995).
90. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 82, at 409.
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States v. Newman91 significantly narrowed the definition. The follow-
ing year, in United States v. Salman, the Ninth Circuit squarely
rejected this narrow reading of a personal benefit.92
In particular, Newman and Salman called into question whether a
gift of information to a relative or friend is sufficient to satisfy the
personal benefit element of insider trading. In dicta, the Dirks opin-
ion suggested that “[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and
exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider
makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend.”93 Yet Newman held that evidence of friendship or a personal
relationship alone was insufficient to support an insider trading
charge.94 Rather, the SEC must offer proof of “a meaningfully close
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective,
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuni-
ary or similarly valuable nature.”95 However, in Salman, decided in
July 2015, the Ninth Circuit came out on the exact opposite side of
the issue, creating a circuit split by holding that tipping information
to a relative or friend was sufficient to support a charge of insider
trading.96 In January 2016, the Supreme Court granted the petition
for a writ of certiori in Salman to review the question of whether
objective criteria must be demonstrated to prove personal benefit,
as Newman held, or whether merely evidence of a close familial rela-
tionship such as that presented in Salman can satisfy the personal
benefit requirement.97
Part II provides a close examination of these two important cases
in turn and then draws a few important lessons from the compari-
son. First, these cases demonstrate that moral intuitions may point
in different directions based on the context in which insider trad-
ing occurs—namely, whether the relationship is a familial one or
predominantly within the business context. Second, they reveal that
courts’ attempts to discern insider trading from purely objective cri-
teria can lead to a regime that is underinclusive in terms of its
alignment with moral sensibilities. Finally, they underscore the logi-
cal failings of the personal benefit test as applied to the more novel
91. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242
(2015).
92. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
899.
93. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
94. 773 F.3d at 452.
95. Id.
96. 792 F.3d 1087, 1093–94.
97. Salman v. United States, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899
(No. 15–628); Appellate Motion, United States v. Salman, 2015 WL 7180648 (No. 15-628).
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theories of liability advanced by the SEC post-Dirks, such as the re-
mote tipping chains at issue in both Newman and Salman.
A. United States v. Newman
In Newman, the defendants, two portfolio managers, traded on
information provided by analysts working for them.98 The analysts
received the information as part of an exchange amongst analysts
from various firms, and the case concerned two separate tipping
chains involving information concerning two different stocks.99 In
one of the charged tipping chains, an analyst received information
regarding Dell’s earning numbers before they were publicly re-
leased from the investor relations department. He relayed this
information to an analyst at another firm, Diamondback, who in
turn relayed it to the defendant Todd Newman, a portfolio man-
ager at Diamondback. The Diamondback analyst also passed the tip
to an analyst at Level Global, who passed the information to Level
Global’s portfolio manager Anthony Chiasson, also a defendant in
the case. Both Newman and Chiasson traded on this information
and were three and four levels removed from the source of infor-
mation, respectively.100
In the other tipping chain, which involved the stock of NVIDIA,
an employee of NVIDIA’s finance group tipped earnings numbers
to a former technology company executive who was a friend of his
from church. The executive then passed the information to co-de-
fendant Danny Kuo, an analyst. Kuo tipped the Diamondback and
Level Global analysts, who passed the information to Newman and
Chiasson, respectively. Therefore, defendants Newman and Chias-
son were four levels removed from the tipper with respect to the
NVIDIA stock.101
The defendants in Newman argued that the circumstantial evi-
dence was insufficient to establish that the corporate insiders had
provided the information in exchange for a personal benefit.102 For
one, the Dell insider was not close friends with the analyst that he
provided a tip to, though they had known each other for years,
worked at Dell together, and attended business school with one an-
other.103 Though the evidence showed the Dell insider wanted to
98. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 443.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 444.
103. Id. at 451–52.
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become an analyst, too, and that the analyst gave career advice to
the Dell insider, even passing his resume on to Wall Street
recruiters,104 the Second Circuit found that the evidence did not
establish a sufficiently “objective, consequential” exchange for such
assistance to constitute a personal benefit.105 The Second Circuit
noted that the assistance given by the analyst to the Dell insider was
“little more than the encouragement one would generally expect of
a fellow alumnus or casual acquaintance.”106 This assistance in-
cluded “minor suggestions” on a resume and advice prior to an
informational interview.107 The Second Circuit found it particularly
significant that the analyst testified he would have given the Dell
insider advice even had the insider not given him information, be-
cause he routinely did so for other colleagues in the industry, and
had been providing the Dell insider with advice for over a year
before the insider began providing any tips to the analyst—sug-
gesting that his motive for providing career advice was not a quid pro
quo to receive inside information.108
With respect to the NVIDIA tipping chain, the evidence estab-
lished that the NVIDIA insider and analyst tippee met through
church, were family friends, and occasionally socialized together.109
The Second Circuit noted that the two were merely “casual ac-
quaintances,” and furthermore, that the insider did not know that
the analyst was trading the stock of NVIDIA, which undermined the
inference that the two had swapped information as part of some
sort of exchange.110
Writing for the majority, Judge Parker wrote that an inference
that the insider received a personal benefit was “impermissible in
the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship
that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and
represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valua-
ble nature.”111 The “mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a
casual or social nature” was insufficient to satisfy the personal bene-
fit element.112 The Second Circuit expressed fear that inferring that
an insider received a personal benefit from such circumstantial evi-
dence would allow the government to meet its burden of proof by
104. Id. at 452.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 453.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 452.
110. Id. at 453.
111. Id. at 452.
112. Id.
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simply “proving that two individuals were alumni of the same school
or attended the same church,” rendering the personal benefit re-
quirement a “nullity.”113
Regardless of whether there was a personal benefit exchanged,
the Second Circuit further noted that there was no evidence that
the defendants Newman and Chiasson knew that the insiders had
personally benefitted from providing information.114 Because the
insider’s liability is derivative of a fiduciary duty, the disclosure of
confidential information, standing alone, is not a breach—the tip-
pee must know that the insider received some personal benefit in
exchange for the disclosure.115 The opinion suggests that, without
requiring knowledge of the personal benefit received, the law
would verge on the parity-of-information scheme rejected in
Chiarella and again in Dirks.116 Therefore, the rationale in Newman,
notably, was consistent with the Supreme Court line of cases de-
cided under Justice Powell, which focused merely on the fiduciary
duty element as proof of fraud and rejected the notion that insider
trading law should be concerned with leveling the playing field be-
tween all market participants.117
B. United States v. Salman
The Ninth Circuit in Salman unequivocally refused to adopt the
standard for personal benefit as established by Newman. In Salman,
the insider, Maher Kara, worked as an investment banker for Ci-
tigroup’s healthcare group and provided his older brother,
Michael, with information about upcoming mergers and acquisi-
tions of and by clients of Citigroup.118 Maher provided Michael with
the information despite knowing that he was trading on it.119
Michael then further passed this information along to defendant
Bassam Yacoub Salman, Maher’s future brother-in-law, whom
Michael had become close to during the course of Maher’s engage-
ment to Salman’s sister.120 Michael encouraged Salman to “mirror-
113. Id.
114. Id. at 453.
115. Id. at 448.
116. Id. at 448–49.
117. Id. at 449.
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image” his trading activity.121 Significantly, Salman knew that Maher
had been providing the information to Michael.122
The evidence established that Michael and Maher “enjoyed a
close and mutually beneficial relationship.”123 Michael had helped
pay for Maher’s college, helped teach Maher some of the scientific
concepts relevant to Maher’s work in the healthcare industry, and
stood in Maher’s wedding.124 Maher further testified to his deep
love for his brother and that he had provided the information in
order to “benefit him” and “fulfill whatever needs he had.”125 When
Maher knew that Michael was in need of money, he provided him
with inside information.126 For his part, Salman was aware of the
close relationship between Michael and Maher, and even agreed to
“protect” Maher from liability.127 The Court found such awareness
on the part of Salman sufficient to establish that Salman knew that
Maher intended to benefit Michael by providing him with confiden-
tial information.128
The Ninth Circuit held that Maher’s disclosure of confidential
information to Michael “was precisely the ‘gift of confidential infor-
mation to a trading relative’ that Dirks envisioned.”129 Furthermore,
the Ninth Circuit rejected Salman’s argument that the holding in
Newman counseled that Dirks required evidence of a tangible per-
sonal benefit.130 The Ninth Circuit noted that, to the extent
Newman could be read to require a showing of a tangible benefit,
this would clearly depart from the Dirks holding that a gift of infor-
mation to a relative or friend was sufficient to establish the personal
benefit. As such, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow Newman.131
C. Lessons to be Drawn from Newman and Salman
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of the personal benefit stan-
dard as articulated in Newman, which suggested that a personal







127. Id. at 1089, 1092. The Ninth Circuit in Salman noted that, on a visit to Salman’s
office, Maher noticed papers relating to their stock trading activity out in the open. Maher
admonished Salman and instructed him to be more careful with the information. Id. at 1089.
128. Id. at 1094.
129. Id. at 1092 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
130. Id. at 1093.
131. Id.
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insider trading law. The facts of Salman may not have been the best
test case for disputing the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the
required benchmark to prove a personal benefit, as they suggested
that Maher Kara did receive tangible returns for providing the in-
formation.132 Given that the court in Salman probably could have
found a showing of a tangible benefit on the facts before it, some
have suggested that Salman did not actually require the Ninth Cir-
cuit to outwardly reject the Newman standard in the manner it
did.133 These cases therefore may be emblematic of deeper divisions
among courts regarding the merits of the personal benefit test.134
To the extent these two opinions diverge, it could have significant
ramifications on insider trading law. If, on appeal, the Supreme
Court requires a showing of a tangible personal benefit, the govern-
ment’s burden of proof in insider trading cases will become
substantially higher.135 In fact, in the weeks following the Newman
decision, the SEC and DOJ vacated a number of guilty pleas by re-
mote tippees, suggesting that the agencies would have a more
difficult time establishing liability for insider trading if required to
prove a tangible benefit.136
But aside from differences in prosecution that could result de-
pending on the standard adopted, the differing outcomes in these
cases highlight broader issues relating to insider trading law. These
differences may provide guidance on directions for future reform
in the law of insider trading.
One key distinction between Newman and Salman is that while the
former may be interpreted as occurring predominantly within the
context of a business relationship, the latter dealt with a familial
132. For instance, Michael had helped pay for Maher’s college and the SEC also
presented direct evidence that the information was intended as a gift, since Maher testified
that he hoped to benefit and provide for Michael. Id. at 1089, 1094.
133. See, e.g., Genesis, supra note 61, at 859 (arguing that the outcome in Newman is consis-
tent with the logic in Dirks and the history subsequent to Dirks).
134. The Salman opinion is interesting in its own regard, for reasons existing wholly
outside the facts of the case itself. Judge Rakoff, sitting by designation in the Ninth Circuit,
had the rare opportunity to question an opinion from the Second Circuit, the bench on
which he usually sits. See Jacob Gershman, Rakoff and Ninth Circuit Throw Cold Water on Insider
Trading Ruling, WALL STREET J. (July 6, 2015, 5:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/07/
06/rakoff-and-ninth-circuit-throw-cold-water-on-insider-trading-ruling/.
135. Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, U.S. Asks Supreme Court to Review Insider
Trading Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/31/business/
dealbook/us-asks-supreme-court-to-review-insider-trading-ruling.html?_r=1.
136. INSIDER TRADING ANNUAL REVIEW, MORRISON & FOERSTER (2015), http://
www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2015/02/150211InsiderTradingAnnualReview.
pdf.
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relationship.137 In Newman, unlike Salman, the entire tipping chain
involved professional investors. Thus, the Newman decision might
be interpreted to mean that information shared in the context of a
businesslike relationship will generally be insufficient to satisfy the
personal benefit requirement.138
In fact, familial cases, for the most part, are the easiest ones to
resolve. If the insider, as in Salman, provides stock tips to his
brother, who works in a wholly unrelated industry, it is exactly the
sort of “gift of confidential information”139 contemplated by Dirks,
and, having no “corporate purpose,”140 manifests the sort of unfair,
exploitative behavior that moral intuitions counsel should be pre-
vented by insider trading laws. By contrast, for efficiency reasons, it
may make sense to safeguard the exchange of information in pure
business relationships. As Justice Powell pointed out in Dirks, legiti-
mate business reasons may exist for exchanging information.141
Indeed, market analysts’ value is highly dependent on seeking out
new information.142 Moreover, the SEC’s adoption of Regulation
FD, which prohibits issuers from making selective disclosures to
analysts and investors, seemingly solves the problem of informa-
tional advantages within the context of those investor/issuer
relationships, mitigating much of the need for insider trading
prosecution.143
Not all cases will be as black and white as the fact patterns in
Newman and Salman, however. Though mere acquaintances, such as
the church friends in Newman, will probably not be sufficient for a
finding of personal benefit, one can easily imagine circumstances
where evidence of a more substantial friendship would lead to diffi-
cult questions for courts to resolve. Determining how close is “close
enough” in the context of personal relationships is a fact-intensive
endeavor, and one that courts should understandably be hesitant to




139. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
140. Id. at 654.
141. See id. at 658–59.
142. Id.
143. While Regulation FD specifically imposes liability on issuers not to disclose inside
information, rather than imposing punishment on those who trade on inside information,
this nevertheless is intended to serve as a stopgap to prevent issuers from according informa-
tional advantages to particular investors at the expense of other investors. Admittedly, this
largely serves to create more parity only amongst sophisticated investors, as those are the sorts
that would likely benefit from selective disclosures.
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undertake.144 Even to the extent Newman can be interpreted as per-
mitting information exchanges in the context of business
relationships, this standard will not always be clear. Newman itself
involved a situation where the two not only traded professional ad-
vice, but also had attended business school and church together,
suggesting a friendship element in addition to the business
relationship.
Perhaps recognizing the difficulty in making these fact-intensive
inquiries, the Newman court emphasized the importance of focus-
ing on objective criteria. This leads to a second lesson to be drawn
from a comparison of these two cases, which is that courts’ attempts
to discern insider trading from purely objective criteria might lead
to a regime that is under-inclusive in terms of its alignment with
moral sensibilities. In Newman itself, the relationship could be seen
as toeing the line between business and personal, but the court
downplayed the personal element by focusing on an objective quid
pro quo. Yet, as the opinion in Salman noted, if the Newman standard
is read literally, it would enable an insider in possession of inside
information to “disclose that information to her relatives, and they
would be free to trade on it, provided only that she asked for no
tangible compensation in return.”145 Not only would such a result
clearly misalign with notions of fairness, it would permit insider
trading that had no legitimate business purposes.
A final observation on Newman and Salman is that both involved
chains of tipping. As discussed in Part I, the logic behind applying
the personal benefit test in the context of remote tipping chains is
attenuated, particularly as the tippees get further away from the ini-
tial source of the information. In Newman, a key issue was whether
the defendant knew the insider had received a personal benefit for
the information,146 which was particularly difficult to show given the
defendants were three or four layers removed from the source of
the information.147 In Salman, by contrast, there was merely one
link between the defendant and the source of the information. On
that evidence, it was much more apparent that the defendant knew
who the source of information was. These cases, therefore, illustrate
that as tipping chains become more complex, it will be harder to
show that a defendant knew of a personal benefit received by the
144. See Brief for Petitioner at *43, United States v. Salman, No. 15-628, 2016 WL 2732058
(Sup. Ct. May 6, 2016).
145. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
899.
146. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447–50 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
242 (2015).
147. Id. at 443.
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insider, thereby undermining the personal benefit test. More im-
portantly, it seems much harder to say that the personal benefit
received by the insider is related in any meaningful way to someone
who trades on the information three or four levels down the line,
since there will often be little connection between the two.
D. Abandoning the Personal Benefit Requirement
These lessons drawn from a comparison of Newman and Salman
underscore the failings of the personal benefit requirement in im-
portant ways. First, to the extent that insider trading laws should
not inhibit legitimate analyst research efforts—such as the informa-
tion exchanged in the context of purely business relationships—the
personal benefit requirement can result in difficulties. This is be-
cause it is often difficult to draw such fine lines when business
relationships spill over into other contexts. Second, if courts look to
objective criteria to resolve such subjective inquiries, they could fail
to capture some information exchanges that many think should be
subject to insider trading liability for moral reasons. Finally, these
cases demonstrate the already recognized problems of applying the
personal benefit test in cases arising under the remote tippee theo-
ries of liability.
Taken together, these lessons suggest that the personal benefit
test—a required element for establishing insider trading liability—
is problematic, if not entirely unworkable. Part III advocates that
the personal benefit requirement should be abandoned, and a new
statutory scheme adopted.
PART III: A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO REFORMING INSIDER
TRADING LAW
Newman and Salman are revealing cases, in that both moral sensi-
bilities and reliance on market efficiency principles seem to warrant
the same conclusions the courts reached. Yet Newman provoked
great outcry, prompting multiple federal statutory proposals to re-
form insider trading law,148 an appeal of the decision to the
Supreme Court,149 and a fervent dialogue in the mainstream media
regarding what this case means for the future of insider trading
prosecutions.150 Insofar as the trading in Newman occurred
148. Henning, supra note 4.
149. Denniston, supra note 3.
150. See, e.g., Stohr & Hurtado, supra note 2.
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predominantly in the realm of a business relationship, it might be
said that Newman reached the right result. So why was the reaction
to the decision so negative?
Perhaps what seems so appalling about the result in Newman is
that the court’s rendering of personal benefit is at odds with the
plain language of Dirks, leaving confusion in the decision’s wake.151
Though the Newman and Salman decisions received a unique level
of public attention, the confusion resulting from these decisions is
consistent with lower courts’ struggles over the decades following
the Dirks decision to apply the personal benefit test in a way that
makes logical sense. Part III argues that the difficulty in applying
the personal benefit test, as manifested in the most recent circuit
split, demonstrates the need for a new approach to insider trading.
Part III examines where insider trading law would stand if the per-
sonal benefit test were eliminated, and critiques two current
legislative proposals, neither of which rely on a showing of personal
benefit as necessary to establish insider trading liability. It will be
demonstrated that both of these proposals are overbroad and
poorly-crafted, and would result in liability in a number of situa-
tions where it should not apply. Finally, Part III will propose
alternative statutory text that may serve as a starting point for dis-
cussion of adopting legislation.
A. Starting from a Blank Slate: The Benefits of Pursuing a Legislative
Approach
The difficulty in attempting to rationalize—and reconcile—the
differing opinions reached by the Second Circuit in Newman and
Ninth Circuit in Salman illustrates just how unpredictable and
murky the personal benefit requirement seems to be in application.
Some of this mess derives from the attempts to fit insider trading
law within 10b-5, the vaguely worded anti-fraud provision of the
1934 Exchange Act. As Professor Langevoort noted, treating insider
trading as a form of fraud in itself is “intellectually awkward because
there is relatively little about unlawful insider trading that can fairly
be considered deceptive, yet deception is the essence of fraud. The
result is a crazy-quilt of made-up doctrinal innovations to declare
abusive trading fraudulent.”152 Such “intellectual awkwardness” is
151. But see Genesis, supra note 61, at 873 (stating that whether the definition of “personal
benefit” adopted in Newman is actually at odds with Dirks is a matter of “close” debate).
152. Donald C. Langevoort, What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the Scienter Re-
quirement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 52, 52 (Stephen M. Bainbridge &
William D. Warren eds., 2013) [hereinafter What Were They Thinking?].
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apparent in Justice Powell’s opinion in Dirks.153 The Court felt that
requiring proof of a personal benefit received by the insider would
provide an objective inquiry into whether the defendant breached a
fiduciary duty.154 Given that the personal benefit test itself was an
attempt to apply more objective criteria to insider trading, it is
somewhat ironic that the current debate about the meaning of the
personal benefit test centers around whether objective criteria is
required to prove that element itself.
The complex chain of logic leading to the adoption of the per-
sonal benefit test illustrates the difficulties with insider trading
jurisprudence. The personal benefit test cannot easily be aban-
doned without rejecting the very fiduciary requirement at the heart
of Supreme Court insider trading jurisprudence, dating back to
Chiarella and Dirks. Enacting legislation specifically directed towards
insider trading would thus provide the most straightforward route
to reforming the law, since attacking specific problematic elements
of insider trading law—namely, the personal benefit test—would
consequently begin to unravel more of the underlying assumptions
and precedent that comprise the judge-made body of law that con-
trols insider trading today.155 Significantly, the political climate
seems ripe for a new statutory framework for insider trading. In
2015, both the House and the Senate issued separate proposals for
statutes that would codify insider trading laws and remove insider
trading from the confines of Rule 10b-5.156
A legislative approach to insider trading would reap benefits for
both prosecutors and defendants. By divorcing insider trading law
from Rule 10b-5, an insider trading statute would ideally codify the
law in language that makes the law’s application more predictable,
thus alleviating some of the due process concerns that have been
raised with insider trading prosecution under Section 10(b).157
Some degree of predictability is necessary when the stakes are as
high as those here, where defendants face potentially severe civil
153. See supra Part I.D.
154. Justice O’Connor proposed the personal benefit test as an alternative to Justice Pow-
ell’s original proposal of considering the purpose or intent of the tipper in providing this
information. Justice O’Connor feared that such a test would require a difficult subjective
inquiry into the minds of defendants. Genesis, supra note 61, at 865–66.
155. A number of critics argue that the way insider trading prosecutions play out today,
the existence of a fiduciary duty breach as the basis for an insider trading violation has al-
ready eroded. See supra Part I.A.
156. See Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015); Stop Illegal
Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015).
157. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at *41, United States v. Salman, No. 15-628, 2016 WL
2732058 (Sup. Ct. May 6, 2016); Brief of Amicus Curiae Mark Cuban in Support of Petitioner
at *2–4, United States v. Salman, No. 15-628 (Sup. Ct. May 13, 2016).
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penalties and even possible criminal liability.158 Of course, this pre-
dictability would come at some expense to the flexibility the SEC
has exercised by developing novel theories of insider trading. In
particular, a statute should not be so inflexible as to provide a
“blueprint for fraud,”159 enabling insiders to find loopholes in the
law to exploit. However, a statute that meets the right balance be-
tween flexibility and predictability could still give recognition to
more novel theories the SEC has pursued, such as the misappropri-
ation theory and tipper/tippee liability. Moreover, such legislation
could enable insider trading law to balance the twin rationales of
insider trading as articulated by Cady, Roberts—both eliminating in-
formational disparities and preventing insiders from abusing their
inside position. In that sense, it would be a “win” for the SEC, since
it envisions a broader regime of insider trading liability than one
grounded in the breach of a fiduciary duty. Of course, there will be
tradeoffs: the more the law moves towards a parity-of-information
scheme, the more market efficiency may suffer from sophisticated
investors having to police their conduct internally and refrain from
trading on information that has not been made available to the rest
of the market, as Justice Powell expressed his concern with in
Dirks.160 A thorough examination of the House and Senate Propos-
als will illustrate some of these tradeoffs.
B. An Analysis of Two Legislative Proposals to Insider Trading Law
This Part will evaluate the House and Senate proposals by apply-
ing them to the fact patterns of Newman and Salman. These two
cases provide a useful illustration. If the outcome in Newman is cor-
rect for reasons of market efficiency, then an ideal insider trading
statute should permit the sort of information exchange amongst
professional investors that occurred in Newman. By contrast, moral
intuitions suggest that the tipper in Salman abused his insider posi-
tion by providing gifts to close family members of information he
knew to be confidential. Such an exchange was entirely lacking in
business-related motives that might be justified for efficiency
reasons.
Since Newman is the narrower case of liability than Salman, it pro-
vides a good barometer of the breadth of liability the statutes would
158. One who is found guilty of insider trading may face up to twenty years in prison and
a $5 million fine. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff (2002).
159. REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, & PREVENTION, supra note 40, at §2.01.
160. Supra Part I.D.
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result in. While the House and Senate proposals—both issued
within a month or two of the Newman decision—come across largely
as a knee-jerk reaction to an isolated case that provoked staunch
criticism from Congress and the media, they nevertheless illustrate
what an insider trading statute might look like.
1. The Senate Proposal
The Senate proposal presents numerous problems, most notably
that it would result in liability in a far broader range of situations
than the type of conduct that is morally reprehensible. The Senate
proposal would amend §10 of the Exchange Act to make it illegal:
‘(d)(1)(A) To purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or sale
of any security on the basis of material information that the
person knows or has reason to know is not publicly available.
‘(B) To knowingly or recklessly communicate material in-
formation that the person knows or has reason to know is not
publicly available to any other person under circumstances in
which it is reasonably foreseeable that such communication is
likely to result in a violation of subparagraph (A).161
This proposal is vaguely worded and would have far-reaching
consequences. Under this proposal, it is clear that the conduct of
Salman would be impermissible, given his knowledge that the infor-
mation was not publicly available. But it would also go much
further, catching a great deal of conduct that is not morally
reprehensible.
First, the Senate proposal prohibits the purchase or sale of a se-
curity on the basis of any material information that is not publicly
available. It defines “not publicly available” very broadly to exclude
“information that the person has independently developed from
publicly available sources.”162 Essentially, it is advocating for a par-
ity-of-information scheme. However, in seeking to level the playing
field as between all market participants—both sophisticated and
non-sophisticated—this proposal is unrealistic about how profes-
sional investors really operate. Given their more proximate
relationships with issuers, there may be situations in which analysts
and institutional investors receive information that has not been
broadly publicly disseminated. That is not to say it is right for them
161. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015).
162. Id.
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to receive such information when other investors do not have ac-
cess—and potentially even profit off of it—but the important point
is that issuers are prohibited from selectively disclosing information
to analysts under Regulation FD. The intent of the Senate proposal
may have been to create a net underneath this conduct by holding
the investors equally liable, but such a regime would create ineffi-
ciencies. From the perspective of the analyst, it may not always be
clear whether the information is publicly available or not, and to
put the onus on investors to root out whether the information has
been publicly disclosed makes little sense—particularly where crim-
inal liability could attach. The issuer, not the investor, is in the best
position to make such a determination of whether the information
is public; that is why Regulation FD sensibly holds the issuer
accountable.
Second, the Senate proposal does not consider how the defen-
dant obtained the information. It contains no requirement that the
defendant misappropriated the information or that the defendant
obtained the information in violation of a fiduciary duty or breach
of confidentiality. The lack of a threshold requirement that the in-
formation somehow be obtained improperly marks a very broad
departure from the current regime of insider trading. Worse, it
conceivably could be used to pin liability on one who somehow
stumbles upon nonpublic information and trades on it, presuming
that they should have known better.
Third, the Senate’s proposed scienter requirement poses signifi-
cant problems. It would impose liability not just on those who
know, but also on those who should have known. This sounds like it
is suggesting a standard of recklessness—a standard many critics
have rejected as too low a threshold for liability for potential crimi-
nal penalties imposed by insider trading laws.163 Moreover, such a
low standard in the context of business relationships might be inef-
ficient if overly cautious managers asked analysts to diligently and
carefully account for every source on which they based their recom-
mendations, or even worse, refrain from making legitimate trades
altogether. Such an approach would be neither practical nor
desirable.
When these shortcomings are taken together, the Senate propo-
sal risks chilling a great deal of legitimate investing behavior.
Consider the facts of Newman. There is no doubt that the informa-
tion at issue there was not publicly available at the time it was
tipped, and few would argue that advance earnings information is
not material. Given that there is no threshold requirement that the
163. What Were They Thinking?, supra note 152, at 53.
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defendants Newman and Chiasson obtained the information
through some improper means, all that would remain to be shown
was that when Newman and Chiasson purchased the stock of Dell
and NVIDIA, they knew, or had reason to know, that the informa-
tion was not publicly available.
Though in Newman, the Second Circuit found the defendants did
not know the information was not publicly available,164 it is easy to
see that they could have potentially been found liable under the
Senate’s proposed scienter of recklessness. The earnings informa-
tion that comprised the alleged tip in Newman was the sort of
routine financial information analysts can regularly predict with rel-
ative precision by using financial models.165 Hence, given the
routine nature of the information, the defendants might be able to
argue they had no reason to know that the information was not
publicly available, and the Newman case might still achieve the same
result under the Senate proposal. But the SEC could conceivably
argue that the defendants should have known the information was
nonpublic because they should have asked the analysts presenting
the models where they obtained the information. This creates a
slippery slope. It is unrealistic to think that, in the regular course of
investment, managers will engage in extensive conversations with
their analysts about every assumption upon which a financial model
was built. Furthermore, situations could arise where the informa-
tion divulged was more unique than in Newman, and hence, should
arguably raise questions in the eyes of the portfolio manager. This
would result in difficult line-drawing problems for the courts, as it
would be unclear whether the information was routine, and there-
fore should not have prompted further questioning, or if it was the
sort of information that the defendant should have known was not
publicly available.
Today, securities laws recognize that there will necessarily be
some imbalance between professional investors and the general in-
vesting public. The Senate’s broad proposal fails to recognize this
164. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 453 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242
(2015)  (“It is largely uncontroverted that Chiasson and Newman, and even their analysts . . .
knew next to nothing about the insiders.”).
165. Id. at 454 (“[A]nalysts at hedge funds routinely estimate metrics such as revenue,
gross margin, operating margin, and earnings per share through legitimate financial model-
ing using publicly available information and educated assumptions about industry and
company trends.”). Given the precision with which financial models are able to predict earn-
ings information, one might wonder whether the tipped information really provided much
benefit to the defendants at all. Certainly, an insider trading regime concerned with prose-
cuting situations where defendants accorded only a minimal informational advantage over
the marketplace would seem to be a vast waste of resources, and little help to the policy goal
of reducing information asymmetries.
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nuance in its attempt to cast a wider net to find more insider trad-
ing violations.
2. The House Proposal
Prior to the Senate proposal, Representative Stephen Lynch of
Massachusetts introduced legislation, the Ban Insider Trading Act
of 2015, in the House in direct response to the Newman decision.166
Notably, the bill, as proposed, specifically states that proof of a per-
sonal benefit is not required to prove liability.167 The bill would
make it illegal:
To purchase or sell any security, or any securities-based swap
agreement, based on information that the person knows or,
considering factors including financial sophistication, knowl-
edge of and experience in financial matters, position in a
company, and amount of assets under management, should
know is material information and inside information.168
Further, it establishes liability for aiding and abetting liability to
capture the act of tipping information by deeming it a violation:
If the person intentionally discloses without a legitimate busi-
ness purpose to another person information that the discloser
knows or, considering factors including financial sophistica-
tion, knowledge of and experience in financial matters,
position in a company, and amount of assets under manage-
ment, should know is material information and inside
information.169
The House proposal offers at least some advantages over the Senate
proposal since it does not go so far as to say that all investors should
have equal access to information. Rather, it requires that informa-
tion somehow be obtained improperly by defining “inside
information” as information obtained illegally, “directly or indi-
rectly from an issuer with an expectation of confidentiality or that
166. Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Congressman Introduces Bill to Ban Insider Trading, LAW 360
(March 2, 2015, 1:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/626497.
167. Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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such information will only be used for a legitimate business pur-
poses” [sic], or “in “violation of a fiduciary duty.”170 This language
seems to be a direct response to the dicta in Newman discussing
Dirks by specifying that only a breach of the duty of loyalty, not con-
fidentiality, could constitute deception and hence violate Rule 10b-
5.171 The idea that only a breach of the duty of loyalty, and not
confidentiality, suffices for insider trading liability seems to be
founded on the premise that deception is necessary for conduct to
be considered “fraudulent.” But once insider trading is removed
from the statutory confines of Rule 10b-5—as any legislative propo-
sal almost certainly would—such limits no longer are necessary to
preserve this logic. A legislative proposal that recognizes a duty of
confidentiality has the virtue of reducing informational asymme-
tries. It also comports with moral intuitions that it is wrong for one
to breach a promise to keep information confidential.
Another virtue of how the House proposal defines “inside infor-
mation” is that it recognizes that there may be some business
situations in which information that is nonpublic might be traded
for legitimate reasons—perhaps in the case of professional inves-
tors. Thus, this language saves the statute from being overly broad,
and adopts what might be interpreted as a “parity-lite” scheme. It
helps level the playing field, but does not go so far as to say that the
playing field between all market players—particularly, as between
professional investors and non-professionals—must be completely
even.
Nevertheless, the House proposal, too, has its shortcomings.
First, like the Senate proposal, reckless use of inside information
would suffice to establish liability. For reasons discussed earlier, this
is problematic. Second, it is unclear from the definition what would
qualify as a “legitimate business purpose.” Third, and perhaps most
problematic, it focuses on financial sophistication as a nexus for
whether or not one is liable. This eschews the fact-intensive per-
sonal benefit test for another fact-intensive test.172 How are courts
to decide what constitutes a requisite level of financial sophistica-
tion? Even within the finance industry itself, a wide range of
financial sophistication is evident.173 Additionally, aligning liability
170. Id.
171. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242
(2015) (“For purposes of insider trading liability, the insider’s disclosure of confidential in-
formation, standing alone, is not a breach.”).
172. See supra Part II.C (discussing why fact-intensive tests are particularly problematic in
the insider trading context).
173. In effect, the House proposal is saying that some investors are more in need of pro-
tection than others, but it may not be the case that those with the greatest level of “financial
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with one’s level of financial sophistication does not reflect the
moral culpability of the investors. Someone who is greedy but stu-
pid might be able to claim they had no reason to know they were
trading on inside information. Moreover, correlating liability with a
level of financial sophistication would capture—and hold liable—
some of the very legitimate professional investing behavior that
should be insulated from insider trading liability.
Certainly, an ideal insider trading regime should not give every
professional investor a free pass to take advantage of inside infor-
mation just because they are sophisticated. But it also should not
chill the sort of productive analyst research that is vital to healthy
functioning markets. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that is-
suers have every incentive not to disclose information in violation of
a duty of confidentiality, because they can then be held liable under
Regulation FD for making a selective disclosure.174
A final problem with the House proposal is that it defines “inside
information” to include information obtained “in violation of a fi-
duciary duty.”175 Missing from the statute is how prosecutors would
go about proving that the defendant breached a fiduciary duty with-
out proving a personal benefit. In this regard, it is hard to see how
the House proposal entirely escapes the personal benefit require-
ment that it explicitly shuns.
Applying this statute to the fact patterns of Newman further eluci-
dates these problems with the House proposal, which in many ways
appears tailor-made to pin liability on the defendants in Newman.
Recall that in Newman, the portfolio managers-cum-defendants,
Newman and Chiasson, received information three or four levels
removed from the source. This information fits the House’s defini-
tion of “inside information” because the defendants obtained the
information “indirectly from an issuer with an expectation of confi-
dentiality.”176 As to the requisite level of financial sophistication, it
seems almost certain that both portfolio managers have a high level
sophistication” are in the know. As an illustration, compare the “garage” investors of the firm
Cornwall Capital Management with the prototypical “sophisticated” investor, the world’s larg-
est and most sophisticated investment banks (known as the “bulge bracket”). As depicted in
Michael Lewis’s book The Big Short, the investors of Cornwall started an investment firm in a
garage in Berkeley, California, and profited over 80:1 (an $80 million profit from a $1 mil-
lion bet) by purchasing credit default swaps. Through the purchase of credit default swaps,
Cornwall, in effect, bet against securities known as collateralized debt obligations composed
of hundreds of mortgage bonds, which provided astronomical returns when the housing
market crashed. Standing on the other sides of these bets were some of the most “sophisti-
cated” investment firms, including Bear Stearns and Deutsche Bank. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG
SHORT, 104–35, 222 (1st ed. 2010).
174. See supra Part II.C; supra Part I.B.
175. Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015).
176. H.R. 1173 § 2(a)(3)(A).
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of financial sophistication and experience in financial matters as
defined by the statutory proposal. Chiasson cofounded the hedge
fund Level Global, and the firm had $4 billion in assets under man-
agement at one point in time.177 Newman served as a portfolio
manager for Diamondback Capital, a hedge fund that at one point
had over $6 billion in assets under management.178 Given this finan-
cial sophistication, the SEC could easily prove that the portfolio
managers “should have” known that the information was inside in-
formation. Particularly because Newman and Chiasson occupied
high positions in companies that managed significant assets, they
should have known that they would be under the scrutiny of the
SEC, and therefore should have done more due diligence into the
sources of their information.179 But this is the type of overly-cau-
tious, inefficient behavior the law should not compel.
3. An Alternative Proposal
Both the House and the Senate proposals were knee-jerk reac-
tions to the Newman decision, and the language seems crafted to
directly target the sort of conduct at issue in Newman without think-
ing about the consequences such broad restrictions would have on
legitimate trading activity. After discussing the shortcomings of the
House and the Senate proposals, we now turn to consider what an
insider trading statute that strikes the right balance between
preventing the sort of insider trading that interferes with our moral
sensibilities and not unduly intruding on productive investing activ-
ity, might look like.
This statute would have a few key features. First, an ideal insider
trading statute would put into explicit language the theories of in-
sider trading that courts have already reached broad consensus on,
such as the misappropriation theory and theories of tipper/tippee
liability. Second, the statute would wipe away all of the language
that has created confusion in insider trading precedent, including
177. Julia La Roche, Ex-Level Global Employee: We’ll Never Get Our Reputations Back, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Dec. 10, 2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/level-global-reputations-
destroyed-2014-12.
178. Chad Bray, Diamondback is Shutting Down, WALL STREET J., Dec. 6, 2012, at C3. At the
time the SEC brought charges against Newman, Diamondback had approximately $2 billion
in assets under management. Id.
179. In fact, the SEC did make such an argument in Newman, alleging that as sophisti-
cated traders, the defendants must have known that information was disclosed by insiders in
breach of a fiduciary duty.  United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
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attempts to tie the conduct to some sort of deception, a require-
ment of a fiduciary duty, and a finding of a personal benefit. Third,
it would provide enough flexibility to capture unusual fact patterns
that seem particularly morally reprehensible, but not become so
flexible as to make it difficult for defendants to recognize when
their conduct is within permissible bounds, thus chilling legitimate
exchanges of information for business purposes. Notice may result
from two sources—language that is clearly written and prohibitions
that generally comport with moral intuitions of what sort of behav-
ior is appropriate. The closer insider trading law can come to
aligning with moral intuitions about what kind of conduct is and is
not permissible, the greater its predictability, since defendants can
hardly argue that they were caught off guard by the law. Fourth, in
that same vein, an ideal approach would require a scienter of
knowledge in order to establish criminal liability. A lower level of
scienter, such as recklessness, would suffice as an element for civil
penalties. Fifth, an insider trading statute should recognize that
there may be professional investment activity that seemingly toes
the line between legitimate and non-legitimate uses of nonpublic
information. The use of information in a professional investing
context should not be chilled.
To clearly articulate what conduct is prohibited, this proposal
will lay out separate standards for each tipper, tipping, and tippee
liability. Neither the House nor the Senate proposal take such an
approach. The House proposal relies on confusing language of aid-
ing and abetting liability to establish tipper/tippee liability. The
Senate and House proposals both impose the same prohibitions on
an insider who trades on inside information and on an outsider
(tippee) who trades on information. It is useful to set out different
standards for tipper, tippee, and tipping liability in order to ac-
count for the various sorts of activity that might fall under an
insider trading prohibition, and more closely reflect the sort of
mindset and conduct that should attach for different types of activi-
ties to be considered morally culpable. Finally, these standards will
be tested against the fact patterns of Newman and Salman as
benchmarks. As discussed, the courts in both cases arguably
reached the right results for reasons of market efficiency and mo-
rality, but a key reason for the backlash in Newman was its unfaithful
application of the Dirks standard.180
The case of an insider who trades on information obtained or
misappropriated through an employment relationship represents
the prototypical case of insider trading. The corporate officers and
180. Supra Part III.
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executives who trade in advance of the announcement of drilling
results to the public in Texas Gulf Sulphur181 represents a straightfor-
ward case. But insider trading liability has also expanded to align
with moral intuitions in misappropriation cases like O’Hagan, where
the employee received access to information by virtue of his em-
ployment as a lawyer, even though he did not necessarily owe a
fiduciary duty to the corporation whose shares he traded on.182 A
prohibition on insider trading in the case of an insider should
cover both sorts of cases, and might be defined as follows:
To purchase or sell any security, or securities-based swap
agreement, based on material information that an employee
has access to by virtue of the employment relationship, where
that information has been entrusted to the employee or the
employee knows or has reason to know the information is un-
disclosed to the public.
“Employment relationship” would be defined broadly to include
the sorts of temporary insiders, such as attorneys, accountants, and
investment bankers that regularly receive inside access to informa-
tion.183 Where an employee knows or has reason to know that the
information is undisclosed,184 or where that information has been
entrusted to the employee, there is no problem of notice: it is clear
that such trading activity would take unfair advantage of informa-
tion that is not available to others, and, thus, imposing liability here
comports with our moral intuitions.
In the case of an insider tipping information to an outside party,
it would be illegal:
To communicate material information, that has been en-
trusted to a person and that the person knows has not been
disclosed to the public, to another person with the knowledge
181. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
182. Kugler and Green’s study suggests that people view insider trading fitting the classi-
cal and misappropriation fact patterns as being similarly blameworthy. Green & Kugler, supra
note 21, at 463.
183. Borderline cases might arise in situations such as with Chiarella, where the defendant
obtained access to information by virtue of his employment as a printer. Directorships may
also present difficulties, since directors are not technically employees of a corporation but
nevertheless have access to material nonpublic information. Moral intuitions would counsel
in favor of a broader definition of “employment relationship” that includes directors and
others who obtain inside information solely as a result of that employment relationship.
184. As noted above, a lower level of scienter, such as recklessness, could be sufficient for
civil penalties to attach. Supra Part III.B.1.
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or intent that the other person will purchase or sell any secur-
ity, or securities-based swap agreement, on the basis of that
information.
Significantly, this definition dispels the requirement that the in-
sider receive a personal benefit in exchange for tipping
information. Rather, receipt of a personal benefit might serve as
part of a larger inquiry into whether the tipper knew or intended
that the outsider trade on the information, but it would not be a
required element of proof to establish tipping liability, as it is under
current law. Other evidence may also suffice to establish that the
tipper knew or intended that the information be traded on.185
Whereas this proposed standard for insider liability focuses pri-
marily on the employment relationship providing special access to
information, in the case of tippee liability, the emphasis would be
on what it means to be “entrusted” with confidential information.
As with the proposed definition for insider liability, the existence of
an employment relationship providing access to confidential infor-
mation would certainly be sufficient to show that one had been
entrusted with information. SEC Rule 10b5-2 further outlines cir-
cumstances for when a duty of trust exists for the purpose of
misappropriation cases, and could provide a definitional starting
point for other situations in which one might be considered to be
“entrusted” with information. Such circumstances include an agree-
ment to maintain information in confidence; a history, pattern, or
practice of sharing confidences; or the receipt of information from
a relative.186
This proposal would capture conduct like the tipping in Salman.
Maher, the brother who worked as an investment banker at Morgan
Stanley, would be liable as a tipper because of his employment rela-
tionship giving him access to non-public information. The evidence
certainly suggested that Maher had knowledge that his brother
Michael traded on the information Maher provided him, and per-
haps that he even so intended. For instance, even as Michael
185. These forms of proof that a tipper knew or intended that the information be traded
on could come in a variety of forms. See, e.g., United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1089
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899. (tipper’s instruction to tippee suggesting that he
get rid of papers), SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006) (understanding that woman
would inform her brother with “a wink and a nod” if she learned significant news about a
stock’s value), SEC v. Vaskevitch, 657 F. Supp. 312, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (pattern of telephone
calls to tipper’s home from locations tippee had access to, shortly followed by large volumes
of trading in securities of company tipper knew from his work at Merrill Lynch would soon
be engaging in a merger).
186. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
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became “more brazen and more persistent” in his requests for in-
formation, Maher continued to provide information.187 Maher even
testified that he hoped to benefit and provide for Michael, sug-
gesting he intended for Michael to trade on the information.188
Maher’s brother, Michael, would also be liable as a tipper for
providing information to Salman, as Maher entrusted him with the
information. That relationship of trust arose from their relation-
ship as brothers and Maher’s history of sharing information with
Michael. Michael further intended that Salman trade on it, “en-
couraging Salman to ‘mirror-image’ his trading activity.”189
Finally, an insider trading statute would necessarily need to de-
fine what suffices to establish tippee liability, by making it illegal:
To purchase or sell any security, or any securities-based swap
agreement on the basis of material information that the tippee
knows (a) that the source of the information has access to by
virtue of the employment relationship; and (b) has not been
disclosed to the public.
Tippee liability is perhaps the most difficult to define, as tippee
trading often treads a fine line between immoral and efficient be-
havior. It should not suffice merely that the tippee knew the
information to be undisclosed to the public, since such a broad def-
inition could have a chilling effect on productive analyst
behavior.190 This proposal thus requires that, in addition to know-
ing that the information is non-public, the tippee must know that
the source of the information accessed such inside information by
virtue of the employment relationship. Another virtue of this defini-
tion is that it aligns squarely with the proposed standard for insider
liability, providing additional clarity to put traders on notice of pro-
hibited conduct.
To see how such a definition might apply in practice, consider
the facts of Salman. As a tippee, Michael of course knew that his
brother was accessing the inside information through his employ-
ment with Morgan Stanley. Salman would further be liable as a
tippee because he knew that Maher was the source. Additionally,




190. Justice Powell made this observation in Dirks. 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983) (“Imposing a
duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic
information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role
of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a
healthy market.”).
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they both knew the information was non-public. Based on Salman’s
attempts to cover up his knowledge of the inside information,
largely at Michael’s urging, the circumstantial evidence demon-
strated that they both knew the trading activity was illegal.191 Such
attempts to cover up trading activity are not the sort of acts under-
taken by one who believes his or her conduct is innocent.
But this proposal for tippee liability also reflects the fact that, as
tipping chains get longer, such as that in Newman where the defend-
ants were three or four levels removed from the source of the
information, moral culpability is often diminished because it is less
clear to the ultimate tippee that the information received was inside
information. Importantly, both defendants in Newman, Chiasson
and Newman, would not be liable under this definition because the
SEC failed to prove that the defendants knew the information to be
inside information.
These fact patterns illustrate that liability under this proposed
standard for tippee liability requires some degree of moral culpabil-
ity. Liability would not extend to situations where a tippee merely
overhears information and trades on it, such as if a third party over-
heard a conversation in a public forum, unless the tippee somehow
knew both that the information was nonpublic and that the insider
had access to such information by virtue of their employment.192 It
is unlikely that they would know such things without having a pre-
existing relationship with the insider or having engaged in some
form of surreptitious conduct.
Clearly then, these proposals for tippee, tipping, and insider lia-
bility would still capture the type of morally reprehensible conduct
at issue in Salman, where the defendant took advantage of informa-
tion he had no business to know, from the type of legitimate
trading activity occurring in Newman. These proposals seek a bal-
ance between market efficiency and the sort of behavior—taking
advantage of one’s inside access to information—that is widely
viewed as morally abhorrent.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the need for reform in insider trading
law is evident following the decisions in Newman and Salman. The
191. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1089 (describing testimony that Salman agreed to “protect”
Maher by shredding papers relating to his stock trading activities).
192. Green and Kugler’s study confirmed that people are significantly more reluctant to
impose punishment on one who trades on inside information acquired only incidentally or
through happenstance. Green & Kugler, supra note 21, at 464.
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central dispute in these cases—whether a gift of information to a
relative or friend is sufficient to satisfy the personal benefit element
of insider trading—highlights the failings of the test itself. First, it
results in ambiguity when applied to relationships that are neither
purely business nor purely personal. Second, it may not capture
every instance of trading behavior that appears morally reprehensi-
ble. Finally, the logic behind the personal benefit test appears
particularly unstable in cases of remote tipping like that at issue in
Newman.
Moreover, the difficulty in applying the personal benefit test is
emblematic of larger problems in insider trading law, which has de-
parted over time from the strict fiduciary duty framework
articulated in early Supreme Court decisions. Because the reliance
on a breach of a fiduciary duty itself stemmed from the vaguely
worded antifraud provision used to prosecute insider trading, Rule
10b-5, Newman and Salman demonstrate the need for a new statu-
tory approach to insider trading free from the forced antifraud
framework. In critiquing the House and Senate proposals offered
in response to Newman, this Note identified some key features of an
insider trading statute. First, such a statute would clearly articulate
the various theories of insider trading liability that courts have al-
ready acknowledged. Second, the statute would no longer attempt
to tie the violating conduct to some sort of deception, breach of
fiduciary duty, or finding of a personal benefit. Third, it would pro-
vide flexibility to prevent traders from exploiting loopholes, but
would also clearly define when trading activity violates the statute.
Fourth, it would require a scienter of knowledge in order to estab-
lish criminal liability. Finally, it would prevent insider trading in the
sort of circumstances where it seems morally reprehensible, without
chilling the use of inside information for legitimate business
purposes.
